Spyridon Rangos

Visiting Fellow

  • Affiliation
    University of Patras
    Research Project:
    Truth and Activity in Aristotle's Metaphysics

Spyridon Rangos is an Associate Professor of Ancient Greek Literature and Philosophy at the University of Patras. He has been educated in the University of Athens, the École Pratique des Hautes Études (Paris), and the University of Cambridge where he received his Ph.D. In 1995-1996 he was granted a Seeger Hannah Davies Research Fellowship from the Program in Hellenic Studies, Princeton University. Among his publications is a book (co-authored with Dimitris Kyrtatas) entitled Greek Antiquity: War-Politics-Culture (Thessaloniki 2010) and many papers on Greek literature, religion and philosophy. Recent titles include:“Plato on the Nature of the Sudden Moment, and the Asymmetry of the Second Part of the Parmenides”, Dialogue 53 (2014); “First Philosophy, Truth, and the History of Being in Aristotle’s Metaphysics”, Claudia Baracchi (ed.), The Bloomsbury Companion to Aristotle (Bloomsbury 2014); “Would You Knowingly Choose a Life of Everyday Little Deaths? (Philebus 53c4-55c3)” (OUP 2017); “On the Proems and Closures of Plato’s Dialogues in the Third Thrasyllan Tetralogy” (Brill 2017). Spyridon Rangos is currently translating and annotating Aristotle’s Metaphysics in modern Greek

About the Research Project

Truth and Activity in Aristotle's Metaphysics

The problem to be addressed concerns the role of truth in Aristotle’s metaphysical quest. In book Epsilon, chapter 4, Aristotle explicitly denies that truth is relevant to first philosophy on the grounds that truth indicates an affection (πάθος) of the mind (διάνοια) rather than some common property of external reality. However, at the end of book Theta a whole chapter (Θ 10) is devoted to truth which is emphatically said to be “the most authoritative sense of being”. On the face of it, there is an obvious contradiction here. Moreover, Θ 10 bears no obvious relation to the preceding nine chapters which are devoted to an analysis of capacity (δύναμις) and activity (ἐνέργεια). Scholars have long since noticed the two problems, and have variously tried to account for them. No consensus has been reached, though. What has not been extensively attempted so far is an approach that indicates in what precise sense the truth of Θ10 is not “an affection of the mind” and, more importantly, how that sense of truth presupposes the preceding analysis of activity.


  • θαυμάζειν – ἀπορεῖν – φιλοσοφεῖν: Η αρχή της φιλοσοφίας και η φιλοσοφία ως αρχή στην κλασική εποχή
    MIET Publications,

Previous Roles

  • Visiting Research Fellow
    2016 - 2016
  • Postdoctoral Research Fellow
    1995 - 1996